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STATEMENT OF THE CASE: 
Nature of the Case 
One evening last January, the Coeur d'Alene Police threatened to shelter Devin 
Ray Bischoff's three-year-old son, whom they had found playing in the street by himself, 
and insisted that Mr. Bischoff allow the police to search his home. After purportedly 
obtaining Mr. Bischoff's consent, the police found drugs and paraphernalia in 
Mr. Bischoff's home. Mr. Bischoff moved to suppress the evidence seized during that 
warrantless search, and the district court denied the motion. Mr. Bischoff then pied 
guilty to felony possession of a controlled substance and misdemeanor injury to a child, 
but preserved his right to challenge the district court's denial of his motion to suppress 
on appeal. 
The district court erred by denying Mr. Bischoff's motion to suppress evidence 
seized during the warrantless search of his home. Mr. Bischoff did not consent to that 
search, and the officer's threats to shelter Mr. Bischoff's son rendered any alleged 
consent involuntarily. This Court should vacate Mr. Bischoff's convictions for 
possession of a controlled substance and injury to a child and reverse the order denying 
his motion to suppress. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On January 29, 2014, Mr. Bischoff was working on his truck in the parking lot of a 
motel where he was living temporarily with his wife, Sheena Freeman, and their three-
year-old son, R.B. (7/14/2014 Tr., p.10, L.23 - p.11, L.2; Transcription of the Audio 
Tape from January 29, 2014 ("1/29/2014 Tr."), 1 p.10, L.25 - p.11, L.25.) Mr. Bischoff 
1 The January 29, 2014 recording was taken by Officer Schmitz's body camera during 
this incident. The district court admitted the recording itself into evidence as Defendant's 
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had left R.B. inside while he tried to fix the family truck, the only vehicle the family 
owned. (1/29/2014 Tr., p.7, Ls.4-19.) Shortly after Mr. Bischoff put R.8. inside, Officer 
Jacob Nielson of the Coeur d'Alene Police Department approached Mr. Bischoff. 
(1/29/2014 Tr., p.7, Ls.18-19; 3/4/20·14 Tr.,2 p.6, L.22 - p.7, L.1.) Officer Nielson and 
another officer, Officer Johann Schmitz, had responded to a welfare check and had 
found R.B. playing in the street with the family dog. (3/4/2014 Tr., p.6, L.22 - p. 7, L.1.) 
In the meantime, Officer Schmitz, with R.B. in tow, went and knocked on the door 
of Mr. Bischoff's unit. (7/14/2014 Tr., p.9, L.1 -- p.10, L.2; 1/29/2014 Tr., p.3, L.4 - p.4, 
L.25.) When no one answered, Officer Schmitz requested that two more officers come 
to the scene, left R.B. with those officers, and went to the parking lot where Officer 
Nielson was talking with Mr. Bischoff. (1/29/2014 Tr., p.5, L.22--p.6, L.15.) 
Mr. Bischoff told the officers that he had put R.B. inside just five to ten minutes 
earlier so that he could work on the family truck, but Officer Schmitz would not have it. 
(1/29/2014 Tr., p.6, L.16 p. 7, L.19.) Just after first making contact with Mr. Bischoff, 
Officer Schmitz began aggressively interrogating and threatening Mr. Bischoff. 
(7/14/2014 Tr., Exhibit A3.) Officer Schmitz repeatedly asked Mr. Bischoff whether there 
were any drugs in his home and threatened to shelter R.B.: 
Officer Schmitz: So you need to explain to me why I shouldn't shelter your 
kid to make sure that you're a qualified parent and your wife is a qualified 
parent. Can you do that? 
Exhibit A to the 7/14/2014 suppression hearing ("7/14/2014 Tr., Exhibit A"). The district 
court admitted the transcript of the recording as Exhibit B at the suppression hearing. 
That transcript is included in the electronic document entitled "Devin Bischoff (Exhibits) 
#42574." Citations to the January 29, 2014, transcript refer to the page numbers that 
appear at the bottom of each page and not the pages of the electronic document. 
2 Citations to the March 3, 2014, preliminary hearing transcript refer to the page 
numbers which appear at the bottom of each page and not the pages of the electronic 
document. 
3 Mr. Bischoff invites the court to listen to the audio tape as it captures Officer Schmitz's 
tone. 
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Mr. Bischoff: Yeah. 
Officer Schmitz: Well, start talking. 
Mr. Bischoff: I just-this is--1 got to get it going. 
Officer Schmitz: So I understand you got to get it going. Do you have any 
friends or anyone else you can call? 
Mr. Bischoff: No. I'm not going to work on it no more tonight. 
Officer Schmitz: Ok. But getting it _going and leaving--how old--is it 
Mr. Bischoff: 
Officer Schmitz: How old is
Mr. Bischoff: Three. 
Officer Schmitz: Three. Do you thin is capable of staying in an 
apartment by himself while you're out king on this car? 
Mr. Bischoff: No. 
Officer Schmitz: I don't think so. 
Mr. Bischoff: I wasn't thinking, so ... 
Officer Schmitz: Are you using or anything? 
Mr. Bischoff: No. 
Officer Schmitz: Is there anything in your apartment? 
Mr. Bischoff: Nope. 
Officer Schmitz: You give my partner permission to look in your apartment 
and go through it? 
Mr. Bischoff: Not without my wife. 
Officer Schmitz: Why not? 
Mr. Bischoff: I just-
3 
Officer Schmitz: You think it's a good enough place for a three-year-old to 
be by yourself [sic] but not a good enough place to let my partner look 
through it? 
Mr. Bischoff: No, not here in the apartment. 
Officer Schmitz: Huh? 
Mr. Bischoff: Not in the apartment. We're getting ready to move. 
Officer Schmitz: Okay. No, the question was: You thought it was safe to 
leave your three-year-old son unattended in your apartment, right? 
Mr. Bischoff: (Inaudible) safe. 
Officer Schmitz: Well, you didn't think it was safe, but you did that anyway 
Mr. Bischoff: Yeah. 
Officer Schmitz: -while you worked on your truck, okay. Your truck 
that's over here and your apartment is No. 17, correct? On the kitty-
corner to where you are, where you have no idea who's coming and 
going; including your son who went out into the street. 
Mr. Bischoff: I feel pretty low right now. 
Officer Schmitz: You should feel pretty low. So my question for you is if 
you think it's okay for your son to be in that apartment, why is it not okay 
for my partner to go in and see if there's anything dangerous there? 
Mr. Bischoff: There's nothing dangerous. 
Officer Schmitz: So why can we not go in and look around? You got a 
bong or somethin' like that? I don't care about bongs and marijuana, 
dude, I really don't. Is that what's in there? Is that it? 
Mr. Bischoff: Yeah. 
Officer Schmitz: Is there anything else in there? Other than-what, is it a 
bong? A little bit of personal use stuff? 
Mr. Bischoff: Yeah. 
Officer Schmitz: Well, no, I appreciate the honesty, but you need to be 
100 percent honest with me because I'm this close to sheltering your kid. 
Okay. It's dark, this is about the shittiest part of town you can get in and 
you-
4 
Mr. Bischoff: (inaudible) here before. 
Officer Schmitz: Okay. Well, how long have you been in this motel? 
Mr. Bischoff: Two, three weeks. 
Officer Schmitz: Where is your wife right now? 
Mr. Bischoff: At work. 
Officer Schmitz: Where does she work? 
Mr. Bischoff: Right up the road. 
Officer Schmitz: Don't tell me right up the road. You know where she 
works. 
Mr. Bischoff: Ambitions. 
Officer Schmitz: Ambitions? 
Mr. Bischoff: Yeah, up the street. 
Officer Schmitz: What's that? 
Mr. Bischoff: Caregiving. 
Officer Schmitz: You going to let my partner go in and get that bong? I'm 
not going to have a bong or a pipe around with the three-year-old kid. 
Mr. Bischoff: Okay. 
Officer Schmitz: Does he have permission to go in?4 I'll talk to your wife 
too. What's her name? 
4 Mr. Bischoff did not verbally respond to that question, and Officer Schmitz did not 
recall that Mr. Bischoff responded nonverbally to that question. (3/4/2014 Tr., p.62, L.13 
- p.63, L.17 (Officer Schmitz testifying at the suppression hearing that "[t]here was 
something that Mr. Bischoff did, either verbal or a gesture" that made him think 
Mr. Bischoff had consented to the search, but that Officer Schmitz could not recall what 
that was), p.66, Ls.1-4 (Officer Schmitz confirming that his report never mentioned any 
gestures made by Mr. Bischoff).) 
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Officer Schmitz: Okay. What's she going to do when I call her and tell her 
I found your kid on the street? 
Mr. Bischoff: (inaudible) 
Officer Schmitz: She's going to flip out on you, isn't she? Because I'm not 
going to leave him with you, man. 
(1/29/2014 Tr., p.8, L.1 - p:12, L.19 (footnote and emphasis added); see also 7/14/20·14 
Tr., Exhibit A.) 
Officer Schmitz then instructed Officer Nielson, "don't go in there yet," and called 
Ms. Freeman. (1/29/2014 Tr., p.12, L.23.) Officer Schmitz asked Ms. Freeman whether 
he could "go in there and make sure there's [sic] not knives and guns laying around." 
(1/29/2014 Tr., p.14, Ls.9--11.) When Ms. Freeman asked whether Mr. Bischoff had 
consented to the search, Officer Schmitz told her that Mr. Bischoff "said it was fine with 
him." (1/29/2014 Tr., p.14, L.19.) Only after Officer Schmitz represented that 
Mr. Bischoff consented to the search did Ms. Freeman give her consent to the search. 
(1/29/2014 Tr., p.14, L.21.) 
Officer Nielson then searched the unit and found a pipe he believed was used to 
smoke methamphetamine. (1/29/2014 Tr., p.17, Ls.15-18.) Officer Schmitz continued 
using R.B. to prod more information out of Mr. Bischoff: "Where's the rest of the meth? 
Be honest with me, man. Honesty is going to go a lot further in my report and keep you 
from losing your kid permanently." (1/29/2014 Tr., p.18, Ls.19-21.) 
Officer Nielson uncovered methamphetamine, marijuana, and additional pipes 
during his search (1/29/2014 Tr., p.21, L.25 - p.26, L.2; 3/4/2014 Tr., p.7, L.12 - p.8, 
L.1.) Officer Schmitz then arrested Mr. Bischoff for felony possession of a controlled 
substance. (1/29/2014 Tr., p.23, Ls.13-16). After Officer Schmitz handcuffed 
Mr. Bischoff, Mr. Bischoff offered to tell Officer Schmitz from whom he bought the 
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methamphetamine. (1/29/2014 Tr., p 24, L.2 -- p.25, L.7.) Officer Schmitz asked 
Mr. Bischoff: "Is it the same guy you've been getting the stuff from?" (1/29/2014 
Tr., p.25, Ls.8--9.) Only after Officer Schmitz placed Mr. Bischoff in his patrol car did 
Officer Schmitz inform Mr. Bischoff of his Miranda rights. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436 (1966); (1/29/2014 Tr., p.28, Ls.5-10.) 
Mr. Bischoff moved to suppress the evidence seized during the warrantless 
search of his home. He argued that he never consented to the search and that any 
alleged consent was involuntary because Officer Schmitz threatened to shelter R.B. and 
the officers had not read Mr. Bischoff his Miranda rights. The district court denied the 
motion. The court found that Mr. Bischoff consented to the search when he said "okay" 
after Officer Schmitz said, "[a]re you going to let my partner go in and get that bong? 
I'm not going to have a bong or pipe around a three year old." (7/14/2014 Tr., p.53, 
L.21 - p.54, L.2.) And although the court acknowledged that Officer Schmitz's threat of 
sheltering R.B. made the question of voluntariness a close one, it found that those 
threats were not coercive because the police in fact could have sheltered R.B. 
(7/14/2014 Tr., p.55, L.10 - p.58, L.23.) Finally, the court found that Mr. Bischoff was 
not in custody and therefore the police did not need to give him a Miranda warning. 
(7/14/2014 Tr., p.58, L.24 - p.59, L.8.) 
After the district court denied the motion, Mr. Bischoff entered a conditional guilty 
plea to felony possession of a controlled substance and misdemeanor injury to a child. 
(7/18/2014 Tr., p.8, Ls.20-23.) For the possession charge, the district court sentenced 
Mr. Bischoff to three years, with one and one-half years fixed, suspended the sentence, 
and placed Mr. Bischoff on probation. (9/17/2014 Tr., p.25, Ls.2-24.) The court 
7 
sentencGd Mr. Bischoff to thirty days on the sl1eriff's labor progr;Jm for injury to a child. 
(9/17/20"14 Tr., p.27, Ls.3--7.) 
8 
~_SUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Bischoff's motion to suppress? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Bischoff's Motion To Suppress 
The United States and Idaho Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and 
seizures. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; ID. CONST. art. I, § 17. Warrantless searches are 
presumptively unreasonable, unless the State proves that the search falls within a well-
recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 
218, 219 (1973); State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288, 290 (1995). A search conducted with 
consent is one exception to the warrant requirement. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219; 
State v. Turek, 150 Idaho 7 45, 7 4 7 (Ct. App. 2011 ). The State must prove both that the 
defendant gave consent to search and that he gave that consent voluntarily. 
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222; State v. Garcia, ·143 Idaho 774, 778 (Ct. App. 2006). The 
Court must exclude evidence discovered during an unlawful search as the "fruit of the 
poisonous tree." Wong Sun v. United States, 37·1 U.S. 471, 488 (1963); see also 
State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511, 519 (2012). 
The State has failed to prove that Mr. Bischoff consented to the search of his 
apartment and that the consent Mr. Bischoff purportedly gave was voluntary. The 
district court therefore erred by denying Mr. Bischoff's motion to suppress the evidence 
seized during the warrantless search of his home. 
A. Standard Of Review 
When reviewing a motion to suppress, the Court defers to the district court's 
factual findings unless clearly erroneous, but exercises free review over questions of 
statutory construction and the district court's application of constitutional principles in 
light of the facts found. State v. Thiel, No. 41811, 2015 WL 847493, at *2 
(Idaho Feb. 27, 2015); State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469, 470 (2001 ). Factual findings are 
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clearly erroneous if they are not supported by substantial evidence in the record. 
State v. Linenberger, 151 Idaho 680, 686 (Ct App. 2011 ). 
B. The State Has Failed To Prove That Mr. Bischoff Consented To The Search Of 
His Home 
When the State claims that the consent exception applies to a warrantless 
search of a home, the State has the heavy burden to prove, by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the defendant consented to the search. Payton v. New York, 
445 U.S. 573, 585-86 (1980) (explaining that the "physical entry of the home is the chief 
evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed") (internal quotation 
marks omitted); State v. Staatz, 132 Idaho 693, 695 (Ct App. 1999); see also State v. 
f-fa/1, 132 Idaho 751, 753 (1999) (explaining that the Fourth Amendment protection 
against unreasonable searches and seizures in a defendant's home "extends to a 
temporary home such as a motel room."). Consent to search may be in the form of 
words, gestures, or conduct, Staatz, 132 Idaho at 695 (citing State v. Knapp, 120 Idaho 
343, 348 (Ct App. 1991 )), but must be "unequivocal and specific," United States v. 
Shaibu, 920 F.2d 1423, 1426 (9th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted); 
see also United States v. Canipe, 569 F.3d 597, 602 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. 
Lyons, 510 F.3d 1225, 1239 (10th Cir. 2007). "When consent to enter and search a 
home must be inferred, the burden on the state of proving consent is 'heaviest."' Staatz, 
132 Idaho at 695 ( quoting Shaibu, 920 F .2d at 1426). 
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the district court considered two 
statements which the State argued amounted to consent by Mr. Bischoff: "[T]he first 
request was for permission to search, and the answer was, 'Not without my wife.' 
Second he was asked, 'Are you going to let my partner go in and get that bong? I'm not 
11 
going to have a bong or pipe around a three year old.' [Mr. Bischoff] answered, 
'[o]kay."' (7/14/2014 Tr., p.53, L.21 - p.54, L.2.) The district court then stated: "I think 
that my reading of the language used on the tape and in the transcript is that at that 
point Mr. Bischoff did give consent. That was the way that it would be interpreted, I 
think, by the officer, and I think that was a reasonable interpretGtion." (7/'14/2014 
Tr., p.54, Ls.3-7.) That finding-----that Mr. Bischoff consented to a search of his home 
when he said "okay"-is unsupported by substantial and competent evidence.5 In fact, 
the evidence in the record flatly contradicts that finding. Because the district court erred 
by concluding that Mr. Bischoff consented, the Court should reverse that finding. 
As an initial matter, Mr. Bischoff responded "okay'' to a question followed by an 
assertion. (1/29/2014 Tr., p.11, Ls.17-20.) Mr. Bischoff could have meant to 
communicate "okay, I give my consent to search" or "okay, I understand you will not 
have a bong around a three year old." More importantly, the term "okay" does not 
unequivocally communicate "yes." See Shaibu, 920 F.2d at 1426. It is commonly used 
to merely acknowledge something that someone has said, without either agreeing or 
disagreeing. In fact, Officer Schmitz himself said "okay" approximately 27 times during 
5 Mr. Bischoff maintains that, consistent with the district court's findings, his earlier 
statement of "not without my wife" did not give consent to search. (1/29/2014 Tr., p.9, 
Ls.3-5; 7/14/2014 Tr., p.54, Ls.3-7.) That statement did not clearly communicate 
whether Mr. Bischoff wanted his wife to be present, whether he wanted to speak with 
his wife, or whether he wanted his wife to consent to the search as well. Nor did the 
officers interpret that statement as giving consent because the officers continued to ask 
Mr. Bischoff for consent after Mr. Bischoff said "not without my wife." (1/29/2014 
Tr., p.11, Ls.17-20.) Moreover, Ms. Freeman's "consent" could not have authorized the 
search. Mr. Bischoff, who was the only physically-present co-occupant, never 
consented to the search. When a defendant who is physically present refuses to 
consent to a search, another co-occupant's consent is not valid as to the defendant. 
See Georgia v. Randoph, 547 U.S. 103, 106 (2006); Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 
1126, 1130 (2014). And Ms. Freeman's consent-which she gave only after Officer 
Schmitz incorrectly told that Mr. Bischoff "said it was fine with him"-is invalid. 
(1/29/2014 Tr., p.14, Ls.18-22.) 
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his interrogation of Mr. Bischoff in response to assertions--not questions-made by 
Mr. Bischoff. (See 1/29/2014 Tr.) 
Further, the district court completely overlooked the fact that, after Mr. Bischoff 
said "okay," Officer Schmitz again asked "does he have permission to go in?" 
(1/29/2014 Tr., p.11, Ls.20-21.) Officer Schmitz's follow-up question, which indicates 
that Officer Schmitz himself did not understand Mr. Bischoff's "okay" to communicate 
consent, contradicts the district court's finding that it was "reasonable" for Officer 
Schmitz to believe that Mr. Bischoff had consented when he said "okay." (7/14/2014 
Tr., p.54, Ls.3--7 (stating that "[t]hat was the way that it would be interpreted, I think, by 
the officer, and I think that was a reasonable interpretation.") (emphasis added). 
Crucially, Mr. Bischoff did not verbally respond to that follow-up question, and Officer 
Schmitz did not testify that Mr. Bischoff responded nonverbally to that question. 
(3/4/2014 Tr., p.62, L.13 - p.63, L.17 (Officer Schmitz testifying that "[t]here was 
something that Mr. Bischoff did that night, either verbal or a gesture" that made him 
think Mr. Bischoff had consented to the search, but that Officer Schmitz could not recall 
what that was), p.67, Ls.1-4 (Officer Schmitz confirming that his written report never 
mentioned any gestures made by Mr. Bischoff.) 
Finally, Officer Schmitz's naked assertion that he had consent, without being able 
to say why, falls far short of the State's heavy burden to affirmatively prove unequivocal 
and specific consent to search Mr. Bischoff's home. For example, the Idaho Court of 
Appeals in Staatz found that the State had failed to meet its burden where "[t]he only 
evidence presented by the state to meet its burden was a 'yes' answer to the question 
whether the officers were 'let' into the home by Mary," the defendant's wife. 132 Idaho 
at 696. The Court of Appeals reasoned: "[T]his one-word answer to a question phrased 
13 
in a conclusory fashion provided no evidentiary facts ::is to what occurred. The 
testimony does not disclose what the officers said to Mary or what she said to them 
before they entered, nor does it describe any act or gesture by Mary that might be 
interpreted as an expression of consent." Id. (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals 
was thus "constrained to hold that, as a rnatter of law, the evidence elicited regarding 
the initial entry into the residence was insufficient to satisfy the state's burden .... " Id. 
Similarly here, the State has presented no evidence that Mr. Bischoff assented when 
Officer Schmitz asked the follow up-question-"[d]oes he have permission to go in?" 
(1/29/2014 Tr., p:11, L.21.) The recording from Officer Schmitz's body camera 
unequivocally proves that Mr. Bischoff did not verbally assent to that question 
(1/29i2014 Tr., p.1 ·1, Ls.20-23; 7/14/2014 Tr., Exhibit A), and Officer Schmitz did not 
document nor could he specifically recall any gesture or act that would have indicated 
an expression of consent (3/4/2014 Tr., p.62, L.13 - p.63, L.17, p.67, Ls.1-4). 
In short, the State has failed to meet its burden of showing unequivocal and 
specific consent. The district court erred by finding that Mr. Bischoff consented to the 
search of his home, and the court should have suppressed the evidence seized as a 
result. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488; Koivu, 152 Idaho at 519. 
C. Even If Mr. Bischoff Consented To The Search, The State Has Failed To Prove 
That Mr. Bischoff Consented Voluntarily 
"Where there is coercion there cannot be consent." Bumper v. N. Carolina, 
391 U.S. 543, 550 (1968). "For no matter how subtly the coercion was applied, the 
resulting 'consent' would be no more than a mere pretext for the unjustified police 
intrusion against which the Fourth Amendment is directed." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 
228. Voluntary consent is "the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice," 
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while consent granted when a defendant's "will has been overborne and his capacity for 
self-determination critically impaired" is involuntary. Id. at 225. Mere acquiescence 
does not constitute knowing, intelligent, and voluntary consent. Bumper, 391 U.S. at 
54f3-49; State v. Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94, 98 (Ct. App. 2006). 
Whether consent was the product of coercion is a factual determination. 
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 229. "The state has a heavy burden to prove that consent 
was given freely and voluntarily," State v. Zavala, 134 Idaho 532, 536 (Ct. App. 2000), 
and that it was not "coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert 
force," Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 228. 
At the suppression hearing, the court discussed what it considered to be the two 
primary factors that Mr. Bischoff has raised to show involuntariness--the presence of 
four police officers and the threats to shelter R.B. (7/14/2014 Tr., p.54, Ls:18-19.) The 
court found that the presence of the police officers was not particularly coercive 
because Mr. Bischoff only ever interacted with two officers. (7/14/2014 Tr., p.54, L.19 -
p.55, L.1.) While noting that the Officer's threats to take R.B. away was "[t]he more 
important issue" and was "a closer question," the court found that that Officer Schmitz's 
threats of sheltering R.B. were not coercive because the police in fact could have 
sheltered R.B. (7/14/2014 Tr., p.55, L.10 - p.58, L.23.) The district court found 
Mr. Bischoff's alleged consent to be voluntary. 
The court erroneously concluded that Mr. Bischoff voluntarily gave Officer 
Schmitz consent to search his home. First, assuming that Mr. Bischoff's "okay" 
amounted to consent to search, Mr. Bischoff only gave that consent because of the 
immensely coercive circumstances surrounding Mr. Bischoff's interaction with Officer 
Schmitz. Most crucially, Officer Schmitz at the very least implied that he would shelter 
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Mr. Bischoff's son unless Mr. Bischoff was honest with the police and consented to a 
search. Second, because the police had no lawful authority to shelter Mr. Bischoff's 
son, those threats rendered Mr. Bischoff's alleged consent involuntary. 
1. The Circumstances Under Which Mr. Bischoff Purportedly Gave 
Consent-Particularly Officer Schmitz's Threats To Shelter R.B.-Were 
Inherently Coercive 
To determine whether a defendant voluntarily gave consent, the court must 
assess "the totality of all the surrounding circumstances-both the characteristics of the 
accused and the details of the interrogation"-including "subtly coercive" police tactics, 
the psychological impact on the defendant, and the defendant's potentially "vulnerable 
subjective state ... " Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226, 229; see also Garcia, 143 Idaho at 
778. Relevant factors include, but are not limited to, "(1) whether Miranda warnings 
were given; (2) the youth of the accused; (3) the accused's level of education or low 
intelligence; (4) the length of the detention; (5) the repeated and prolonged nature of the 
questioning; and (6) deprivation of food or sleep." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226; 
Garcia, 143 Idaho at 778 (considering whether the defendant knew he could deny 
consent; the location, conditions, and time at which the consent was given; whether the 
defendant was free to leave; the number of officers involved; and the lack of any advice 
to the defendant regarding his constitutional rights). "Because each factual situation 
surrounding consent to a search is unique, [the Court] may also take into account any 
other factors that [it] deem[s] relevant." Liberal v. Estrada, 632 F.3d 1064, 1082 
(9th Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. Patayan Soriano, 361 F.3d 494, 502 (9th Cir. 
2004) (in which the court considered police threats to take away the defendant's 
children in determining whether consent was coerced or voluntary)). 
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'The relationship between parent and child embodies a primordial and 
fundamental value of our society." United States v. Tingle, 658 F.2d 1332, 1336 
(9th Cir. 1981 ). When law enforcement officers deliberately prey upon a parent by 
inculcating fear that the parent will not see his child in order to elicit "cooperation," the 
law enforcement officers exert improper influence over the parent. Id. (finding that an 
officer's threats that the defendant "might not see her two-year-old child for a while" 
contributed to the involuntariness of the defendant's consent); see also Lynumn v. 
Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963) (finding a confession involuntary when the police told 
the defendant that her children would be taken from her if she did not cooperate); 
United States v. Hatley, 15 F.3d 856, 858 (9th Cir. 1994) (in which the police's 
"manifestly improper" behavior of threatening to take the defendant's child away 
rendered his consent involuntary). 
Contrary to the district court's conclusion, the circumstances surrounding 
Mr. Bischoff's purported consent were immensely coercive. 6 Officer Nielson and Officer 
Schmitz approached Mr. Bischoff in a motel parking lot after dark. (1/29/2014 Tr., p.10, 
Ls.21-23, p.4, L.15.) Mr. Bischoff was leaning up against his truck during much of the 
interaction, with the police standing in front and on either side of him, one about four or 
five feet away and the other about eight to ten feet away. (7/14/2014 Tr., p.24, L.22 
p.23, l.10.) From the get-go, Officer Schmitz put his authority over Mr. Bischoff on high 
display. Officer Schmitz spoke in an aggressive, threatening manner. (7/14/2014 
6 The district court did not explicitly decide whether Officer Schmitz's threats, along with 
the totality of the circumstances, would have been sufficiently coercive to render 
Mr. Bischoff's alleged consent involuntary if Officer Schmitz in fact did not have the 
lawful authority to shelter R.B. (See 7/14/2014 Tr., p.50, L.19 - p.59, L.9.) Mr. Bischoff 
contends, however, that this Court can make that determination on the record before it 
without remanding to the district court. If the Court disagrees, Mr. Bischoff asks that the 
Court remand to the district court to make additional factual findings. 
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Tr., Exhibit A.) Aijer exchanging just a few words with Mr. Bischoff, Officer Schmitz told 
Mr. Bischoff, "you need to explain to me why I shouldn't shelter your kid to make sure 
that you're a qualified parent and your wife is a qualified parent," and then asked "are 
you using or anything?" (1/29/2014 Tr., p.8, Ls.1-4, p.8, L.24.) Mr. Bischoff was not 
free to leave because the police had his son. The officers did not inform Mr. Bischoff 
that he had a right to refuse consent, nor did they give him Miranda warnings. 7 
(See 1/29/2014 Tr.; 7/14/2014 Tr., p.27, L.11 - p.28, L.14.) 
Even setting aside the above considerations, Officer Schmitz's attempt to garner 
Mr. Bischoff's consent by threatening to take away his three-year-old child renders 
Mr. Bischoff's consent involuntary. The magnitude of that threat-reaching to the heart 
of "perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests"-cannot be overstated. 
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). Officer Schmitz made it abundantly clear 
that Mr. Bischoff had a choice-either Mr. Bischoff would cooperate with the officers or 
he would risk losing his sane. (1/29/2014 Tr., p.8, L.1 - p.11, L.20 (Officer Schmitz 
stating: "So you need to explain to me why I shouldn't shelter your kid to make sure 
that you're a qualified parent and your wife is a qualified parent."), p.10, Ls.19-21 
(Officer Schmitz telling Mr. Bischoff: "[Y]ou need to be 100 percent honest with me 
because I'm this close to sheltering your kid.").) Officer Schmitz also told Mr. Bischoff 
that if Mr. Bischoff's home was safe for a child, Mr. Bischoff would have no reason to 
refuse to allow an officer take a look around. (1/29/2014 Tr., p.9, Ls.8-10 (Officer 
Schmitz stating: "You think it's a good enough place for a three-year-old to be by 
yourself [sic] but not a good enough place to let my partner look through it?"), p.10, 
7 Officer Schmitz gave Mr. Bischoff Miranda warnings later on, after Officer Schmitz 
arrested Mr. Bischoff and placed him in a patrol car. (1/29/2014 Tr., p.23, L.8 - p.28, 
L.14; 7/14/2014 Tr., p.28, Ls.15-23.) 
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Ls.4-8 (Officer Schmitz reiterating: "[l]f you think it's okay for your son to be in that 
apartment, why is it not okay for my partner to go in and see if there's anything 
dangerous there.").) Officer Schmitz's threats to take R.B. away unless Mr. Bischoff 
cooperated were inherently coercive. 
2. Officer Schmitz Had No Lawful Authority To Shelter R.B., And So His 
Threats Rendered Mr. Bischoff's Purported Consent Involuntary 
"[V]oluntariness of consent is not impaired simply because one is faced with two 
unpleasant choices," so long as the officer has the legal authority to do what he 
threatens. Garcia, 143 Idaho at 779; State v. Abeyta, ·131 Idaho 704, 708-09 (Ct. App. 
1998) (police threats to obtain a warrant if defendant did not consent to a search did not 
render consent involuntary where police cou!d have legally obtained a search warrant). 
But when consent is based on an officer's threats that are unsupported by any legal 
authority, the consent is invalid. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 233 (stating that consent 
"granted only in submission to a claim of lawful authority" is invalid); Bumper, 391 U.S. 
at 549-50; (finding consent involuntary because the officer requesting consent 
represented that he had a search warrant, when in fact he did not). 
"The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and 
management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been 
model parents .... " Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); see also Troxell v. 
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000). Indeed, the Due Process Clause of the United 
States Constitution allows the government to intervene in a parent's relationship with his 
child, without first providing due process, only if the child is "threatened with imminent 
harm when it is justified by emergency circumstances." Doe v. Kearney, 329 F.3d 1286, 
1293 (11th Cir. 2003) (surveying cases from the U.S. Circuit Courts); Mueller v. Aucker, 
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700 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir. 2012). Idaho law reflects this standard by providing that 
law enforcement may shelter a child without first obtaining a court order "only where the 
child is endangered in his surroundings and prompt removal is necessary to prevent 
serious physical or mental injury to the child ... " Idaho Code § 16-1608(1)(a) 
(emphasis added); see also Matter of X, 110 Idaho 44, 45 (1986) (in which a police 
detective temporarily took X, a four-year-old girl, from her parents' care because various 
interviews done of X by a doctor and social worker led them to believe her parents had 
sexually abused her); Mueller, 700 F.3d at 1187-1188 (approving, in the qualified 
immunity context, an Idaho detective's decision that an infant was in imminent danger 
warranting emergency removal because doctors had diagnosed her with life-threatening 
meningitis and her parents refused to get her medical treatment). 
Here, the district court erroneously dismissed Officer Schmitz's threats as based 
on Officer Schmitz's lawful authority. The court reasoned: 
The more important issue, I think is the discussion about the son-
the defendant's son being taken from him. I think this is a closer question. 
However, a review of the transcript shows me that the way this was 
presented was always phrased in doing what was in the best interests of 
the child. 
I think the context has to be considered. Here the officers find a 
three-year-old child in the middle of the street in the middle of the winter 
with no one anywhere in the home or nearby to take care of him. It seems 
to me that it's entirely reasonable for the officers to want to inspect the 
residence for the welfare of the child and reasonable for the officers to 
inform the defendant that, absent their ability to do so, the child could be 
placed in protective custody. I think it would have been unreasonable-or 
it could have been viewed as not proper police procedure for the officers 
to do anything else. For example, finding a kid in the street like that and 
returning him to the residence without checking to make sure that there 
was not a reason to worry about his future welfare. 
The defendant was obviously faced with a choice. He chose to 
consent. But here the officers did not falsely represent anything to the 
defendant. Idaho Code [§] 16-1608 authorizes a child to be sheltered if 
he is in danger. 
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... The officers only informed Mr. Bischoff of what the law a If owed them to 
do. Accordingly, the discussion about the defendant's son being taken 
away from him did not render his consent involuntary as a result of 
coercion. 
(7/14/2014 Tr., p.55, L.10 - p.58, L.23 (emphasis added).) 
Respectfully, it is not law enforcement's duty, much less its right, to determine 
what is in "the best interests of [a] child." (7/14/2014 Tr., p.55, L.15.) That fundamental 
right is vested in a child's parents, and the government may only usurp that right if the 
child is in "imminent danger," Mueller, 700 F.3d at 1187, or, put another way, if "the child 
is endangered in his surroundings and prompt removal is necessary to prevent serious 
physical or mental injury," I.C. § 16-1608(1)(a). The district court therefore erred by 
concluding that I.C. § 16--1608(1)(a) "authorizes the child to be sheltered if he is in 
danger" (7/14/2014 Tr., p.56, Ls.9-10), and by consequently finding that the officers had 
the authority to shelter R.B. under I.C. § 16-1608(1 )(a), (7/14/2014 Tr., p.58, Ls.20-21 ). 
Further, R.B. was not in danger of serious injury such that prompt removal from 
his parents' care and custody was necessary. As an initial matter, I.C. § 16-1608(1 )(a) 
is inapplicable to the circumstances of this case. The only evidence supporting 
emergency removal was the fact that the police found R.B. playing in the street. Before 
the police spoke with Mr. Bischoff, they had no way of knowing how R.B. ended up in 
the street or whether R.8. was under the care of a parent or someone else. The police 
therefore had no reason to believe that R.B. was so endangered in the care of his 
parents that R.B. would face serious injury unless promptly removed from his parents' 
custody without first obtaining a court order. 
Even after the police learned that Mr. Bischoff had left R.B. alone inside so that 
Mr. Bischoff could fix his truck, Mr. Bischoff's poor judgment could not warrant 
emergency removal-taking R.B. from his parents' care and custody without a court 
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order. AgDin, I.C. § 16-1608C1 )(a) requires that "prompt" removal from a child's home 
or guardian be "necessary" to prevent "serious injury." For example, in Matter of X, 
11 O Idaho at 45, Idaho Health and Welfare took a four-year-old girl from her parents 
because a doctor and social worker believed, after various interviews, that the girl's 
parents sexually abused her. Similarly, the court in Mueller, 700 F.3d at n 87-1188, 
approved of a detective's decision to shelter an infant because doctors had diagnosed 
her with life-threatening meningitis and her parents refused to get her medical 
treatment. Here, the only danger that R.8. faced was no longer a threat once the police 
removed R.B. from the street. And there was no indication that, aside from 
Mr. Bischoff's poor judgment to leave R.B. by himself in his home, Mr. Bischoff posed 
any danger to R.B., let alone a danger requiring prompt removal. Although Mr. Bischoff 
undoubtedly made a poor decision when he left RB. inside alone, that mistake is not so 
severe to permit law enforcement to take R.B. from Mr. Bischoff's care without a court 
order. 
Further, Officer Schmitz's own actions show that Officer Schmitz did not have 
grounds to take RB. Officer Schmitz explained at the suppression hearing that "[m]y 
desire to go in the home was to find out whether or not it was safe as one of the factors 
in deciding whether or not his son was going to get sheltered ... " (7/14/2014 Tr., p.26, 
Ls.19-22.) Yet Officer Schmitz used his threats to shelter R.B. to garner Mr. Bischoff's 
consent. This is the quintessential problem of the chicken and the egg: Officer Schmitz 
needed to look in Mr. Bischoff's home in order to determine whether R.B. was 
"endangered in his surroundings" such that prompt removal without a court order was 
necessary; but, at the same time, Officer Schmitz used the threat of sheltering R.B. in 
order to look inside. This problem is echoed in the district court's decision that it was 
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reasonable for the officers to inform the defendant that, "absent their ability'' to inspect 
the residence, R.B could be placed in protective custody. (7/14/2014 Tr., p.55, Ls.20-
24) (emphasis added.) 
The district court erroneously found that Officer Schmitz had legal cause under 
I.C. § 16--1608(1)(a) to take R.B. from his parents without a court order. Although 
Mr. Bischoff undoubtedly made a poor decision to leave R.B. unattended, that mistake 
alone could not trigger emergency removal under I.C. § 16-1608(1)(a) because R.B. 
was never endangered in his surroundings such that promptly removing R.B. from his 
parents' care was necessary to prevent serious injury. The district court erred by finding 
as much. Because Officer Schmitz had no legal authority to shelter R.B., his hollow 
threats rendered Mr. Bischoff's purported consent involuntary. The district court should 
have suppressed the evidence seized during the warrantless search of Mr. Bischoff's 
home. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488; Koivu, 152 Idaho at 519. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Bischoff respectfully asks that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction 
and reverse thG district court's order denying his motion to suppress. 
DATED this 2yth day of April, 2015. 
MAYA Ff: WALDRON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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